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Abstract
When limiting the extent of the hidden economy, tax inspection may be a
substitute to private monitoring of investment projects. When enforcing in-
vestors protection, the judiciary system is a complement to private governance
as it decreases private monitoring costs. Corporate income tax may ﬁnance
government expenditures related to tax inspectors limiting the hidden economy
and to the judiciary system enforcing investors protection. However, a corpo-
rate income tax increase enhance tax evasion. This paper provides the range of
relevant value for the corporate tax rate which provides incentives for private
monitoring leading to an increase of the number of projects which are ﬁnanced,
with a higher share of external funds.
JEL classiﬁcation number: O16.
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1. Introduction
International organizations such as the IMF, the world bank and the OECD as well as
leading academics in Chicago and Harvard Universities expressed their concern with
respect to the governance of ﬁrms and states, corruption and the impact of institutions
related to the legal system on the economic performance of several countries in the
last decade. Corruption, the lack of investor protection and tax evasion are striking
features of economies in transition (Anderson and Kegels [1998], Berkovitz and Li
[2000], Johnson et al. [2000], Hellmann and Schankerman [2000], Robinson [2001],
Roland and Verdier [2003], Savaﬁan et al. [2001]).
Corruption has negative eﬀects on development through the misallocation of activ-
ities (Schleifer and Vishny [1993], Mauro [1995 and 1998], Bardhan [1997], Acemoglu
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† University of Orleans, LEO, and CEPREMAP, E-mail: jean-bernard.chatelain@univ-orleans.frand Verdier [1998], Ehrlich [2000], Jain [2001]). Corruption is frequent among bureau-
crats (Rose-Ackerman [1978], Peters [2001], Treisman [2000]) and may increase due
to social factors (Tirole [1996]). A high level of widespread corruption can remain for
a long time as a persistent equilibrium (Andvig and Moene [1990]). With respect to
taxation, speciﬁc incentives are required for higher level inspectors or lawyers in case
of contest with tax inspectors (Chand and Moene [1999]). Rising civil servant wages
or indexing thier income on the number of reported cases have some eﬀect for decreas-
ing corruption but is not suﬃcient for eradicating corruption (Besley and MacLaren
[1993], Van Rijckeghem and Weder [2001], Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo [1999]).
The importance of an eﬃcient legal system for providing investors protection has a
striking eﬀect on the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial system, with an advantage for common
law according to La Porta et al. [1997, 1998, 2000, 2002]). An ineﬃcient legal and
judiciary system can remain stuck at an ineﬃcient level for a long time, as observed in
some countries. If the legal system inhibits the development of the ﬁnancial system,
why are the forces which stabilize this low equilibrium? Who gains from an ineﬃcient
system, whereas there are big bills left on the sidewalk for years (Olson [2003])? In a
less dogmatic view with respect to the systematic advantage of common law, Berkovitz
D . ,P i s t o rK .a n dR i c h a r dJ . F .[ 2 0 0 3 ]e v a l u ated the forces at the root of the failures
of historical transplant of legal system families around the world. Rajan and Zingales
[2003] emphasize that in 1913, the advantage of common law countries with respect to
the eﬃciency of investor protection is not found. Hay et al. [1996] present a theory of
legal reform. Pistor [2000] present patterns of legal change with respect to investors
protection in transition economies. Mookhe r j e ea n dP n g[ 1 9 9 5 ]t a c k l et h ei s s u eo f
corrupt law enforcers.
Microeconomic theory of imperfect information and taxation investigated how tax
policy could stimulate entrepreneurship and alleviate informational problems through
special tax schemes, e.g. using investment tax credit policy (De Meza and Webb [1988],
Innes [1991], Keuschnigg and Nielsen [2003]). One may also remark that tax evasion
and the size of the underground economy are related (Jung, Snow and Trandel [1994]).
The size of the underground economy may foster asymmetric information and increase
the risk for private investors. As well, a weak judiciary system has drawbacks with
respect to investors governance when entrepreneurs may use funds for other purposes
than adding value to the ﬁrm (Schleifer and Wolfenson [2002]). A low tax collection
decreases government ability to provide a decent wage for civil servant in charge of
the defense of property rights and increases the relative beneﬁts of bribes.
This paper investigates under which conditions the control of tax evasion and
the eﬃciency of the judiciary system may provide incentives for investors to monitor
ﬁrms (i.e. to improve private governance) and as a consequence to ﬁnance a large
number of investment projects and ﬁrms with a higher leverage with respect to projects
where very little monitoring is necessary (e.g. investors ﬁnance only very short run
working capital). Although the literature emphasizes mostly the complementarity of
the eﬃciency of the judiciary system with private monitoring, it could be the case that
2public monitoring acts as a substitute for private monitoring. In particular, reducing
tax evasion and the size of the underground economy provides some relief for private
investors. Government and investors hold both claims with respect to ﬁrms. The
quality of accounts provided by ﬁrms to the government for tax purpose presents an
obvious informational positive externality for investors. If it is easy to fool the state,
it could be easy as well to fool investors, with respect to law enforcement.
By contrast, an eﬃcient ex-post enforcement of contract by the judiciary system
reduces the costs of monitoring by private investors. Those private monitoring costs
may turn to fall below a threshold so that it turns to be proﬁtable for private investors
to monitor (it provides incentives). Finally, the eﬃciency of the judiciary system
and the eﬃciency of the tax control increases with government income, whereas the
tax increase fosters entrepreneurs to turn to the underground economy. The less tax
evasion, the more likely it is that collected funds will help to ﬁnance judges, police and
ﬁnancial market authorities ensuring that enough money is put for technical assistance
as well as for civil servants incentives. In turn, this may lead to a less widespread
corruption of civil servants, as rising their opportunity cost of deviant behaviour. The
civil servants in charge of the defense of property rights, as well as those in charge of
tax inspection at the higher and intermediate levels are more likely to face the highest
level of bribes, with respect to other public activities (Van Rijckeghem and Weder
[2001]).
Taking into account those eﬀects, we provide the relevant intervals for the tax rate
which provides private incentives for governance and increase the number of project
which are ﬁnanced, for given government eﬃciency functions of the judiciary system
and of the tax control.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 are presented investors and en-
trepreneurs’ behaviour leading to monitoring versus non monitoring regimes. Section
3c o n c l u d e s .
2. The model
The model has ﬁve types of agents: ﬁrms, intermediaries, investors, civil servants
(tax inspectors and civil servants in charge of the defence of investors property rights:
judges, police, ﬁnancial market authorities) and government which describes a ”small”
open economy where the informational asymmetries and monitoring assumptions are
based on Holmstrom and Tirole [1997]. There are two periods. In the ﬁrst period,
ﬁnancial contracts are signed, investment decisions are made, the public level of in-
vestor protection is decided as well as next period civil servants income . In the second
period, investment returns are realised, tax is collected, claims are settled and civil
servant are paid. All parties are risk neutral and protected by limited liability so that
no one can end up with a negative cash position.
32.1. Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by i uniformly distributed on [0,1],
who diﬀer only with respect to their wealth (or internal equity) Ei ≥ 0 distributed
according to the cumulative distribution function F (E). Aggregate entrepreneurs
wealth is given by:
R +∞
0 EdF (E).
Decisions proceed in three steps. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, the en-
trepreneur chooses between two kinds of projects which require both the same ﬁxed
amount of capital, normalized to one: K = 1. If the entrepeneurs’ wealth is below this
ﬁxed size, he needs external funds to be able to invest. These external funds are pro-
vided by uninformed investors or monitoring intermediaries together with uninformed
investors. With asymmetric information, an incentive compatible contract with in-
vestors (either uninformed or monitoring) will rule out the low quality project, but
will credit constrain a proportion of entrepreneurs. In the second period, a proportion
of those entrepreneurs who were able to invest goes bankrupt with a return of zero on
capital and the rest receives a return RK. We assume the probability of success to be
given as pH. In a third step, a proportion f of those who invested and got a return
RK pays taxes whereas a proportion 1 − f decides to evade corporate income tax. f
will be derived endogenously, depending on the level of government expenditures on
tax control and the level of corruption in the economy.
There are two kinds of asymmetric information problems. First, an ex ante moni-
toring problem on choosing investment projects with or without positive net present
value. Second, an ex post problem on contract enforcement, as the return on capital
can be wrongly presented in order to avoid taxes and ﬁnancial contract repayments.
In the ﬁrst ”socially honest” project, we have the following setting: Capital gen-
erates a veriﬁable ﬁnancial return equaling either RK (success) with probability of
success pH or 0 (failure and bankruptcy) with probability 1 − pH. The entrepreneur
has to call external ﬁnance B =1−Ei to ﬁnance the project and to provide a return
RB to outside investors. His returns after paying returns to outside investors are taxed
proportionnaly at the rate τ. Entrepreneur face a probability 1 − f of successfully
evading corporate income tax if, for example, they have the chance to be controlled
by an ineﬃc i e n tt a xi n s p e c t o ro ri ft h e ya r en o tc o n t r o l l e d .T h e yf a c eap r o b a b i l i t yf
of paying the corporate income tax. Whether or not he pays income taxes, he pays oﬀ
the debt to the investors.The expected after tax return of the entrepreneur is then:
(1 − fτ)pH (RK − RB)
In the second, ”socially dishonest”, project the entrepreneur engages in black mar-
ket activity which reduces the probability of success of the oﬃcial project for which
he demands funds on the capital market (as he puts less eﬀort in it): pL <p H.The
black market activity provides without risk a maximal level of private beneﬁts de-
noted X (G) > 0 (which is also a mean to avoid taxes). This ”project” is labeled
X-project in memory of X-ineﬃciency and represents one way of formalizing ex ante
4moral hazard. The return on black market activity depends on government expendi-
tures G for tax control, eﬃciency of the judiciary, rule of low, contract repudiation
and risk of expropriation where a higher amount of governement expenditures de-
crease the return on black market activity. We assume the relationship between the
extent of available black market activities and public control to be of constant elastic-
ity: X (G)=X0G−εX (i.e. a log-linearized approximation around equilibrium values)
where εX denotes the elasticity of black-market activity with respect ot government
control. The expected after tax return of the entrepreneur is then:
(1 − fτ)pL (RK − RB)+X (G)( 2 . 1 )
Outside monitoring by intermediaries decreases the maximal level of private bene-
ﬁts from black market activity from X (G)t ox(G)b yaf a c t o r0< γc < 1, leaving the
probabilities of success unchanged. Then 0 <x(G)=γcX (G) <X(G). This project
is labeled the x-project. The lower γc,t h em o r ee ﬃcient is investors’ monitoring to
limit black market activities. The expected after tax return of the entrepreneur is:
(1 − fτ)pL (RK − RB)+γcX (G)( 2 . 2 )
The rate of return of investor capital on (world) risk free assets is locally taxed and
denoted (1 − τ)R0. It represents the opportunity cost for entrepreneurs in a ”small”
open economy. Furthermore, only the ”socially honest” project is economically viable,
i.e:
(1 − τ)(pHRK − R0) > 0 > (1 − τ)(pLRK − R0)( 2 . 3 )
2.2. Non Monitoring Finance Equilibrium
In this section we derive the optimum amounts of investment of entrepreneurs and
uninformed investors when no monitoring intermediary enters into the market. A
minimum requirement for internal funds will be derived.
Uninformed (or non monitoring) individual investors demand an expected return
which is at least equal to the world ﬁnancial market return (1 − τ)R0 and do not
monitor the entrepreneur that they may ﬁnance. In case of success, entrepreneurs and
uninformed investors share the pre-tax return on capital RK = REE + RuBu where
RE is one plus the rate of return on internal equity, Ru is one plus the rate of return on
uninformed ﬁnance and Bu represents uninformed external ﬁnance. In case of failure,
no proﬁts are distributed. Whenever the expected return investing in the project is
the same as the return on an risk free asset there are enough funds available to ﬁnance
the project. Assuming perfect competiton on the ﬁnancial market, this leads to the
participation constraint of the uninformed investor: pHRuBu = R0Bu.
The entrepreneur chooses its own capital contribution E and the rate of payments
to uninformed investors Ru according to an incentive compatible contract while max-
imising his expected after tax proﬁts:
5(E,Ru) ∈ argmax(1 − fτ)[pH (RK − RuBu)+R0 (E0 − E)]
subject to (i) the internal funds constraint:
0 ≤ E ≤ E0
(ii) the accounting balance sheet equality between assets of ﬁxed size (normalized
to one) and liabilities:
E + Bu =1
(iii) the accounting pre-tax shares of the returns on capital:
RK = REE + RuBu
(iv) the participation constraint of uninformed investors facing perfect competition:
pHRuBu = R0Bu
(v) the X-project incentive constraint:
(1 − fτ)pHREE ≥ (1 − fτ)pLREE + X (G)
This incentive constraint implies that whenever the expected returns for a project
with black market activity are ther same as the expected returns for a project without
black market activity the entrepreneur chooses to be honest and not to engage in black
market activity. It follows from this optimization problem that the ﬁrm will invest
all internal funds available, E = E0, and that the expected rate of return payed to
uninformed investors equals the market rate, Ru = R0/pH.
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Taking into consideration the pre-tax proﬁt sharing constraint (iii) and the balance
sheet equality (ii), the incentive constraint leads to an internal equity/capital ﬂoor,
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6The aggregate tax collection with only uninformed investors is:
Gu = fτΠu
with Πu representing aggregate proﬁts before tax payment:




Under the following assumption (A1), some low wealth entrepreneurs are credit
constrained when the minimal wealth threshold is strictly positive: E1 > 0, that is:
pHRK − R0 <p HR
min
E (X)E
We assume that assumption (A1) holds in the remaining sections of the paper.
2.3. The Monitoring Finance Equilibrium
A continuum of investors distributed on [0,1] may monitor entrepreneurs, at a non
veriﬁable ﬁxed cost c(G) > 0 by preventing entrepreneurs from undertaking a high
level of ”black market” activity (X-project), so that there remains only the ”low
level” of black market activity as a low quality project (x-project). In doing so,
monitoring investors decrease the gain from cheating (due to the two states of nature
assumption, monitoring ﬁnance may be related indiﬀerently to debt or equity: it is
only the governance eﬀort which matters). Monitoring only reduces the black market
activity, however, not the probability of tax evasion. We assume the costs of private
monitoring to be of constant elasticity εC with respect to public expenditures c(G)=
c0G−εC (i.e. a log-linearized approximation around equilibrium values). Monitoring
costs decrease with public expenditures since public expenditures G for the eﬃciency
of the judiciary, rule of law, contract repudiation and risk of expropriation decrease
the available black market activity. For example, whatever the law system (common
law, french law, german law, and so on), if the number of judges is unsuﬃcient, the
costs of judgment increase due to the extended time to obtain the enforcement of
contracts; if the salary of judges is too low, the proportion of corrupt judges may rise.
To some degree, 0 ≤ G ≤ 1 measures the extent of investors protection in a given
country.
Two non exclusive interpretations are possible: (a) monitors provide certiﬁcation
so that uninformed investors are ready to directly invest with less moral hazard (b) un-
informed investors may channel funds through monitoring intermediaries. Due to the
division of labour, ﬁrms do not monitor other ﬁrms.In case of success, entrepreneurs,
uninformed investors and intermediaries share the return: RK = REE+RuBu+RmBm,
where Rm is equal to one plus the return on monitoring ﬁnance Bm. The entrepreneur
chooses its own capital contribution E, the share of monitored external ﬁnance Bm,
the payments to monitoring investors Rm and the payments to uninformed investors
Ru according to an incentive compatible contract:
7max(1 − fτ)[pH (RK − RuBu − RmBm)+R0 (E0 − E)]
subject to (i) the internal funds constraint:
0 ≤ E ≤ E0
(iiM) the asset-liabilities accounting equality:
E + Bu + Bm =1
(iiiM) the accounting pre-tax shares of the returns on capital:
RK = REE + RuBu + RmBm
(iv) the participation constraint of uninformed investors:
pHRuBu = R0Bu
(v) the x-project incentive constraint from the uninformed investors point of view
(due to monitoring, a x-project is available instead of a X-project):
(1 − fτ)pHREE ≥ (1 − fτ)pLREE + x(G)
(vi) the participation constraint of monitoring investors:
pHRmBm = R0Bm + c(G)
(vii) the incentive constraint for the intermediary to monitor is given by:







To behave, the intermediary receives a higher return if cost of monitoring is high
and the probability of getting the contract respected is low (lower investor protection)
and if after tax probability of success in case of ”cheating” increases (i.e. lower tax
rate due to corruption of the tax inspector by the entrepreneur).
To ﬁnd the optimal contract, let us note that the opportunity cost of monitoring
i n v e s t o r si sh i g h e rt h a nt h eo p p o r t u n i t yc o s tof uninformed investors. That is, the cost
of monitoring ﬁnance is higher than the cost of uninformed investors. Entrepreneurs
would demand the minimum level of intermediated capital in order to decrease their
8weighted average cost of capital. Then the monitors incentive constraint, which limits
RmBm is binding. The binding incentive constraint (vii) and the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n

















The entrepreneur incentive constraint (v) amounts to a constraint on the minimal





(1 − fτ)pH − (1 − fτ)pL
With the help of the pre-tax proﬁt sharing constraint (iiiM), the incentive con-



















With the help of the balance sheet equality (iiM), the entrepreneur incentive con-
straint (v) leads to an internal equity/capital ﬂoor, that is a minimal level of wealth
E2 (c)t ob ea b l eﬁnance the capital ﬁxed cost taking into account the incentive con-
straint:










The investors zero-proﬁt condition (iv) determines Ru (which is lower than the




































9Monitoring is too costly to be socially useful when E2 (c) <E 1,w h i c hl e a d st o
























The investors monitoring cost has to be smaller than an endogenous threshold
∼ c,
which measures the maximal eﬃcient value of monitoring costs. This maximal value
of monitoring costs increases if the incentives to cheat for entrepreneurs are higher.
That is, if the return from tax evading black market activity (X) are higher, if the
relative gap between probability of success when some black market activity is done
with respect to normal activity (pL/pH) narrows to one, if the expected tax rate on
normal activity fτ increases (and if the tax evasion is less easy), so that the gain from
tax evading activity increases, and ﬁnally, if the eﬃciency of investors monitoring to
limit black market activity (−γc)i n c r e a s e s .
There are three eﬀects of the public expenditures for the eﬃciency of the tax and
legal system. First, by limiting black market activities, the public monitoring decreases
the available incentives for entrepreneurs. As such, public monitoring is a substitute
to private investors monitoring, so that private monitoring turns to be ineﬃcient or
useless. Second, by contrast, an increase in the tax rate provides additional incentives
for developing tax evading black market activities. As a consequence, an increase
in tax rates rises the maximal eﬃcient value of private monitoring costs. Third, by
limiting the cost of private monitoring when investors need third party enforcement of
contracts, public monitoring is a complement to private monitoring. The second and
third eﬀect are rationale for the positive correlation between law and ﬁnance found in
several cross country regressions on law and ﬁnance by La Porta et al. [1998].
Under the private monitoring condition, the tax collection increases because a
higher number of projects is ﬁnanced:
Gum = fτ (Πu + Πm)
Πm represents the additional aggregate corporate income tax base related to addi-
tional projects which are now ﬁnanced with the help of private ex ante monitoring:




Another assumption is that: 0 <E 2 (c) (assumption A3): some entrepreneurs
remain credit rationed even with monitoring.

































Three eﬀects of public expenditures aﬀect the incentives: the private return from
black market activity, the decrease of the cost of monitoring for investors, the increase
of the tax gap for entrepreneurs between black market activity and observed economy.
a) When the elasticity of private monitoring with respect to public rule of law
expenditures is higher than the elasticity of private black market return with respect
to public rule of law expenditures, (εC > εX), the function g is increasing globally
over [0,1[. Then the private monitoring condition is:
fτ >g
−1 (A) ⇔ f>
g−1 (A)
τ
In that case, there is complementarity between high government public expendi-
tures for the rule of law (and a low tax evasion) and the eﬃciency of private investors
monitoring.
Figure 1: Plot of g(fτ)=
(fτ)εC−εX
1−fτ functions for cases such that εC ≥ εX:







b) For εX = εC, the minimal value of g is now 1, so that monitoring is always
eﬃcient when A ≤ 1.
Else the condition is similar to the a) with a simpliﬁed explicit inverse function.
There is complementarity between public expenditures for the rule of law and investors
monitoring.
c) For εC < εX, the function g is ﬁrst decreasing, then increasing globally over
[0,1] with strictly positive minimum value in this interval, which leads to a condition
C’ ( minG<A) for two solution for the inequality.
11Figure 2: Plot of g(fτ)=
(fτ)εC−εX
1−fτ functions for cases such that εC < εX:
(fτ)εC−εX
1−fτ












(1 − εC + εX) >A(condition A) the moni-
toring condition is always fulﬁlled.
When ming(fτ) <A: then the condition can be fulﬁlled is the tax rate is suf-
ﬁciently low for monitoring (substitution eﬀect) fτ < [g−1 (A)]2 or suﬃciently high
(highest solution for the intersection of the g curve with the horizontal line g−1 (A))
so that fτ > [g−1 (A)]1 (the complementarity eﬀect dominates). In between, tax rate
diﬀerential with black market projects provides incentives for entrepreneurs to cheat
ex ante.
This means that there is 1% more of public expenditures for the rule of law leads
to a higher decrease in percent on black market activities income than the percent
decrease on investors cost of monitoring through law. In that case, investors would
monitor only when government intervention is small.
2.4. Endogenous Tax Evasion and Private Monitoring
In this section, we consider that the probability of tax evasion increases as tax increases
(a fourth eﬀect on taxation). For example, this may lead to a higher level of bribes for
tax inspectors as the gain for tax evasion increases. As well it increases the beneﬁts
of crime so that a cost beneﬁt analysis of crime and punishment would lead to the
following speciﬁcation (Becker [1968], Becker and Stigler [1974]). To simplify matters,
we consider that f(τ)=f0 − δτ ∈ [0,1] is a decreasing function of the tax rate for
τ ∈ [0,1] . Then the conditions depend on the function h(τ)=τf(τ)=f0τ −δτ2.I n
that case, former lower bound equalities of the type h(τ) >g −1 (A) leads also to an
upward bound (under some conditions on f0 and γf to check that this upward bound
is such that τmax < 1) due to an increase in the proportion of tax evasion. Hence, the



















0 − 4δg−1 (A))
¶¸
This leads to conditions for thresholds of public expenditures (with a particular
case with substitutability). Results are summed up in the following proposition:
12Proposition 1. The conditions for the existence of private monitoring extending the
number of ﬁnanced project with a higher leverage (Else, the non-monitoring ﬁnance
equilibrium prevails) are:
(a) For εC ≥ εX (the eﬃciency of public expenditures is higher for contract enforce-
ment than for decreasing the size of the opportunities in theunderground economy) and
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0 − 4δg−1 (A))
´
. The minimal threshold is necessary to
ﬁnance the enforcement of the rule of law. The maximal threshold is related to the
fact that high tax rate increases endogenously tax evasion.





(1 − εC + εX) ≥ A: Any tax rate leads to
private monitoring.





(1 − εC + εX) <A : Tax rate could be either
very low or very high (leading to a very high tax evasion and little tax income) to
take advantage of the substitution eﬀect for the ﬁght against underground economy:






0 − 4δ[g−1 (A)]2)
´
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or relatively high (with a higher limit) to take advantage of the complementar-















0 − 4δ[g−1 (A)]1)
´
T h e s er e s u l t sa r er e l a t e do nt h ee ﬃciency of public expenditures with respect to
the ﬁght against corruption and the hidden economy (i.e. the value of the elasticities
εC and εX).
3. Conclusion
We reached two conclusions. First, when the elasticity of the underground economy
with respect to public expenditures (a substitute to private monitoring) is lower in
absolute value than the elasticity of the private costs of going to court to enforce
ﬁnancial contracts with respect to public expenditures (a complement to private mon-
itoring), there exist a lower limit and an upper limit on the corporate income tax rate
which provides incentives for private monitoring. Ex post third party enforcement of
contracts by the judiciary system leads to ex ante private monitoring, which in turn
leads to an increase in the number of projects which are ﬁnanced, with a larger share
of external funds or a higher leverage.
Second, under the alternative assumption on the elasticities of the eﬃciencies of
public control on tax evasion and of public enforcement of private contracts, a similar
interval with medium values for tax rates provides incentives for monitoring. However,
as the marginal gains on the ﬁght for tax evasion are substitutes to private monitoring,
there is a case for a extreme values of the tax rate to provide incentives for private
13monitoring. Either the tax rate is close to zero or very high (with such a level of
tax evasion that government income is very low): in those cases, the private investors
are left to their responsability for control which is a substitute eﬀect of government
control. Nonetheless, they would do it only if the government third party role for
the enforcement of contract does not fail: that is, if the judiciary system leads to a
private monitoring cost of going to court, including bribes for corrupt judges, which
is suﬃciently low.
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